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Abstract: Based on the DADS, a very detailed French database on wages, we 
show that wage inequalities started to increase in France in the mid-1990s. This 
phenomenon is limited to the top end of income distribution and concerns 
mainly the top 0.1%, whose share of total salaries increased from 1.2% to 2% 
between 1996 and 2007. This increase in inequality was accompanied by some 
changes in the social composition of this wage elite. These include a decline in 
employees in the provinces, in CEOs; and an increase in lower rank manage-
ment like chief officers and other administrative managers, in sportspersons, 
and in Paris Region employees. A sector approach shows that finance (3% of 
private sector employees) is responsible for half of the rise in inequalities at the 
top end of wage distribution. We discuss the role of the size of financial 
activity in the tremendous increase in top financial wages. 
 
Keywords: Inequalities, Wages, Finance, Superstars, France. 
 
JEL classification: D3, G2, J3 
 
Résumé : En nous fondant sur les DADS, une base de données très détaillée 
sur les salaires en France, nous montrons que les inégalités salariales ont 
commencé à augmenter au milieu des années 1990. Ce phénomène est limité à 
l’extrémité supérieure de la distribution des salaires et concerne principalement 
les 0,1% les mieux payés, dont la part au sein de la masse salariale est passée de 
1,2% à 2% entre 1996 et 2007. Cette hausse des inégalités est allée de pair avec 
des changements dans la composition sociale de cette élite salariale, marquée 
en particulier par la diminution des salariés travaillant en Province, des PDG, 
ainsi que par l’augmentation des cadres d’état major non dirigeants, des autres 
cadres administratifs, des sportifs, et des salariés de la région parisienne. Une 
approche sectorielle montre que la finance (3% des salariés du secteur privé) 
est responsable de la moitié de la hausse des inégalités à l’extrémité supérieure 
de la distribution des salaires. Nous analysons le rôle de la taille de l’activité 
financière dans cette hausse considérable des salaires de l’élite financière. 
 
Mots-clés : Inégalités, Salaires, Finance, Superstars, France 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Access to the data was obtained through the CASD dedicated to researchers authorized by 
the French Comité du secret statistique. 
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The rise in inequality in the United States is by now almost common knowl-
edge. The Piketty and Saez (2003) series based on US income taxes have 
shown very clearly the rise in inequalities at the very top of the income distri-
bution since the mid-1960s. By the end of the 20th century, income inequalities 
had caught up with early twentieth-century levels. However, behind this 
similarity, there is a striking difference: inequalities at the end of the century 
were largely due to wage inequalities rather than capital income and to the rise 
of the working Rich. 
This phenomenon is not limited to the USA alone but is much more gen-
eral and international (Atkinson, Piketty, Saez, 2010). Other English-speaking 
countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
have also experienced a sharp rise in inequalities. On the other hand, levels of 
inequality in continental Europe and Japan remained much more stable over 
the last thirty years. Is this contrast due to differences in the type of capitalism 
in those two sets of countries (Amable, 2003), in short, free market capitalism 
on the one hand, and state regulated capitalism on the other hand, or is it 
simply that the same trend towards greater inequality has been delayed in 
continental Europe? Figures from Landais (2007, 2009) show that in France, 
inequalities have been increasing again at a significant rate, but only since the 
late 1990s.  
The analytical description and interpretation of this rise in inequalities is 
also only just beginning. One element of this trend that has been widely 
commented is the tremendous rise in CEO pay over the last thirty years 
(Bebchuck, Grinstein, 2005, Gabaix, Landier, 2008; DiPrete, Erich, Pittinsky, 
2010 ; Nagel, 2010). Another element is the increase in compensations in the 
entertainment industry for sporting or artistic superstars (Rosen, 1981). The 
social importance and visibility of those elites, and the availability of their 
compensation, can explain part of the focus. However, it is not certain that 
they account for much of the rise in inequality. More recently, partly thanks to 
the financial crisis and the bonus outrage, the importance of financial wages 
has been under scrutiny (Kaplan, Rauh, 2009). Philippon and Resheff (2010) 
show that in recent years the financial sector is an industry that grants wages 
that are 50-60% higher than other sectors for jobs requiring the same level of 
qualification. Bell and Van Reenen (2010) estimate that 70% of the recent 
increase of the share of the top 1% in the United Kingdom was captured by 
workers of the financial industry.  
The goal of the following paper is to investigate the transformation of ine-
qualities in France. To that aim, we rely on the DADS data (1976-2007), the 
French Social Security wage data for the private sector. Such data enables us to 
ask questions on the changing patterns of wage inequalities in France. Firstly, 
how reliable is the rise in inequalities discovered by Landais with self-declared 
fiscal sources? If this trend is robust, then who does account for it? CEO, 
managers, experts, entertainment superstars? Since Paris finance is not as 
wealthy as that of London or Wall Street, does it account for as much of the 
rise in inequalities?  
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we will describe the 
data. The second section is devoted to the rise in wage inequalities over the last 
thirty years. The third section deals with the changing characteristics of the 
working Rich in France. In the fourth section we will concentrate on the 
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impact of finance on the evolution of wage inequalities. And finally, in the last 
section, we will give elements of interpretation of the rise in top financial 
wages.  
I. The DADS, a detailed dataset on wages in the pri-
vate sector 
The DADS, Déclaration Annuelle de Données Sociales, is a statistical dataset 
based on an administrative source. In order to collect social contributions for 
the Social Security – payroll taxes which are more or less proportional to an 
employee’s wage – the French Government collects all wages from the private 
sector. Social contributions for national civil servants are collected through a 
different system and, at present, national civil servants are not in the database.  
On the basis of these administrative records, two main datasets are avail-
able. The first is the Panel DADS (1976-2007), which contains 1/24th of the 
private sector wage earners from 1976 to 2001 and 1/12th of the same popula-
tion after 20012. The second dataset is made up of exhaustive files of all jobs in 
the private sectors from 1994 to 2007. The exhaustive files are organized by 
year and by region. It is not possible to identify a worker from one year to 
another3, or even, between 1994 and 2001, from one job to another. 
The great advantage of the DADS is that it offers a very precise image of 
wages in France and enables us to calculate fractiles at the very top of the wage 
distribution. Moreover, unlike other sources (Philippon, Resheff, 2010, 
Kopczuk, Saez, Song, 2010) wages in the DADS are not top coded4. Neverthe-
less, there are some obvious limitations in our data that might lead us to both 
underestimate and overestimate inequalities in France during recent years.  
The notion of wage collected in the DADS is more juridical and fiscal than 
economic. It corresponds to the part of the wage on which social contributions 
are collected. Two main notions of salary are available: the net salary and the 
gross salary.  
The gross salary “base csg” is quite exhaustive. It contains not only fixed sal-
ary and variable salary but also perks (such as car or housing), “participation” 
and “intéressement”, the two main regulated profit sharing devices (DSDS, 2010 : 
35-36). The main limitation is that stock options and free shares are not 
counted inside this notion of salary, since before 2007 no payroll taxes were 
collected directly on these forms of wages. Therefore we may underestimate 
some high salaries like those granted to CEOs of major firms.  
Another problem may arise from the fact that the DADS files are organized 
according to jobs rather than individuals. Are we to calculate inequalities 
among jobs or among individuals? Since workers may have multiple jobs 
during the year (successively or simultaneously), especially in an industry such 
as entertainment, the second option appears more relevant. Unfortunately, this 
                                                 
2 They select people born in October every two years until 2001, and every year thereafter. 
3 However, the exhaustive regional files contain the situation in year t and year t-1, so it is 
possible to measure evolutions over a two-year period of time. 
4 As outliers possibly resulting from transcription errors may have a significant impact on the 
top fractiles we have excluded salaries that were more than 100 times the P99.99 threshold. 
That is, 2 salaries in 1994 over 50 million euros, 1 in 2002 and 4 in 2007 over 100 million 
euros. 
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approach is not possible with exhaustive data files before 2001 since those files 
lack individual identification variables. Therefore, before 2001, we limit our-
selves to full-time non-annex jobs5 and consider that those jobs are held by 
different individuals6.  
It is well known that the notion of hourly wage might not be the best ap-
proach for studying inequalities at the top of the wage distribution since we 
find jobs in consultancy or the leisure industry where people get high wages for 
a very limited set of hours. Moreover, hours are adjusted by INSEE for what 
they consider to be extravagant hourly wages. This leans in favor of using 
yearly wages. Nevertheless, some workers may have jobs in the private sector 
for very short periods of time and therefore appear to be poor on the basis of 
a yearly wage. In some cases, they really are poor and therefore should be taken 
into account. In other cases, they might be students, civil servants, or self-
employed persons who work just a few hours a year as wage-earners in the 
private sector. Counting them on the basis of their yearly wage as low-paid 
workers would be artificial and lead to an overestimation of inequalities. 
Moreover, this fraction of the population might not be stable from one year to 
another and could generate a bias in the patterns of evolution. In order to 
avoid this limitation, we restrict our sample, as in Kopczuk, Saez, Song (2010), 
to salaries that are over half a yearly minimum wage7. We have made sure that 
moving this minimum threshold does not change our qualitative results. 
Let us summarize. First, in the panel (1976-2007) and in the 2002-2007 ex-
haustive files, we use the annual sum of gross wages by individuals that are 
over half a minimum wage8. In the 1994-2001 exhaustive files we use the 
annual gross wage of full-time non-annex jobs that are over half a minimum 
wage. 
II. The rise in inequalities in France 
In order to analyze the evolution of inequalities, we calculate fractiles at the 
top of the wage distribution following Piketty (2001) and Piketty and Saez 
(2003). As the population panel is very important (1/24th and 1/12th) and the 
DADS regional files are exhaustive, there is no need to compute here a 
Paretian approximation of the threshold or the mean of each fractile.  
Graph 1 shows the evolution of wages for different fractiles. We find a 
global increase of wages but at different rates for each fractile. F0-90 is increas-
                                                 
5 A job is considered by INSEE as non-annex if the compensation is over 3 months of 
minimum wage or the number of hours is over 120, the duration over 30 days and the number 
of hours per day over 1.5. A job is full time if the number of hours per day is over a certain 
threshold, which INSEE calculates for each sector.  
6 This approximation first leads us to consider that a person who moves from one job to 
another in the middle of the year has two different jobs and is therefore two different individu-
als. We also exclude individuals who hold many jobs that are annex, part-time or under the 
threshold of half a yearly minimum wage. A comparison of the two approaches is possible for 
2001. In the first approach (based on the 2001 files) we analyze inequalities among 12,670,098 
“workers”. In the second approach (based on the 2002 files that go back to 2001), our analysis 
applies to 15,146,231 workers.  
7 This restriction is applied to both the panel and the exhaustive files. 
8 Before 1999, we use the fiscal gross wage. After 1999 the CSG-based gross wage. As local 
civil servants, mail and hospital workers only enter the panel in the 1980s, for continuity we 
also decided to exclude them from the panel. Local civil servants and hospital civil servants 
were also excluded from the exhaustive files treatment. 
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ing rather slowly. On the whole, F90-95, F95-99 and F99-99.9 seem to increase 
regularly and at the same rate. F99.9-99.99 and F99.99-100, especially over the 
last ten years, increase more quickly. In 2007, the top 0.01%, that is the 1692 
highest-paid persons in the private sector, earning more than 867,000 euros, 
were paid on average 1,682,000 euros a year, whereas the F0-90 evolved 
between 7600 and 46,700 in gross salary and earned on average 22,400 euros a 
year (Appendix, table A2). 
Graph 1. Evolution of constant wages of the different fractiles (in euros, 
2007) 
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Note: In 2007, the mean salary in the top 0.01% was 1,682,324 euros. Sources: Panel DADS 
(1976-2007) and France – exhaustive job files DADS (1994-2007). 
 
The consequences of this trend are the following. The share of the majority 
(F0-90) is globally declining, losing 2 points in 30 years (Appendix, Table A3 
and A4). The share of the “middle classes” defined by the fractiles between 
P90 and P99.9 remain globally stable or are increasing at a slow rate (Table A3 
and A4). When we move to the top 0.1%, however, we can see a sharp increase 
in their share after the year 1996. The share of the top 0.1% increases by 0.8 
points, moving from 1.2% in 1996 up to 2.0%. Half of the 0.8-point increase is 
for the top 0.01% and half for the F99.9-99.99.  
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Graph 2. Evolution of the share of the top 0.1% wage 
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Note: In 2007, the top 0.1% was paid 2.0% of the salaries. Sources: Panel DADS (1976-2007) 
and France – exhaustive job files DADS (1994-2007). 
Given that in the panel the share of the top 0.01% is based on a limited 
number of workers (50-60 up to 2001 and 100-120 after 2001), the robustness 
of the evolution may be questionable. An analysis of the exhaustive files shows 
that the evolution is largely similar. The top 0.1% increases its share by 0.85%, 
moving up from 1.1% in 1996 and 1.95% in 20079. Half of this increase is for 
the top 0.01%. 
Is this evolution reliable? There are some limitations in our data, discussed 
before, which may lead us to both underestimate and overestimate inequalities. 
Moreover, INSEE is generally cautious with income data from DADS, since 
they suspect that some reporting errors might mitigate the quality of the 
description of top incomes. Hence, they generally study lower levels of top 
incomes (Amar, 2007). INSEE believes that errors have been diminishing over 
time (DSDS, 2008). If we consider that the main error at this level is that of 
over-reporting, this should lead us to underestimate the increase in inequalities 
here. 
Nevertheless, when we compare our trends with those of other sources and 
authors like Landais (2007, 2009) or Solard (2010), we find similar qualitative 
results. Landais, based on income self-declaration, finds that between 1998 and 
2006 the total income of the top 0.01% increases by 64% (capital income and 
exercised stock-options included) and the wages of the top 0.01% increases by 
69%. For the same time period and with the same method, we find a 123% 
(exhaustive files) to 131% (panel) increase in the top 0.01% wages. Our evolu-
tion is more pronounced than that given by Landais. Part of the difference may 
be due to the fact that Landais works on self-declared net wages and on larger 
population (including civil-servants). 
                                                 
9 0.05 point of this increase seems to be due to the change of definition in 2001. 
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Solard finds an increase in income of 39% for the top 0.01% (capital in-
come and exercised stock options included) between 2004 and 2007. We find 
an increase of 44% of the top 0.01% in the panel and of 36% in the exhaustive 
files. Although we have all incomes on the one hand and wages on the other, 
the two trends seem rather in line. 
Discrepancies remain due to differences in sources, definition and field, but 
broadly, qualitative results are similar and there is no sign that we have under-
estimated the increase in inequalities. 
III. Changes among the working Rich 
Landais (2009) explores several hypotheses in order to explain this trend in 
terms of biased technological progress and growth of CEO pay due to the 
growing size of firms or superstars. However, given the limitation of his data, 
he cannot give many empirical elements in order to confirm either thesis. 
The great quality of the DADS does not reside in its precision (due to its 
limitation to private sector pay) but in its historical depth and its economic and 
social variables. It is possible to start to explore the change in the social com-
position of the working Rich.  
We therefore studied the change in the composition of the top 0.1% and 
the top 0.01%. The panel gives the composition in terms of jobs, with the 1982 
PCS coding, since 1984. Graph 3 shows some striking transformations within 
the top 0.1%. The first surprise is the decline in CEOs since 199210. Is this 
decline due to the change in the composition of wages, and the rise of stock-
options, that are not reported in the DADS? We do not think so, since the 
decline of CEOs inside the top 0.1% was in volume mainly due to the decline 
of the CEO leading small firms (less than 1000 workers) – CEOs that are less 
likely to earn stock-options. Those small CEOs accounted for 45% of the top 
0.1% in 1992 and dropped to 24% at the end of our period. The share of 
CEOs for large firms is more volatile, but also diminished during the 2000s.  
Although CEO pay for large firms may have risen sharply (Evain, 2007), 
our data suggests that the rise in inequalities is not mainly due to CEO pay or 
to the traditional elites running firms but rather to lower rank managers and 
experts. As long as the CEOs are not the category that is most responsible for 
the rise in wage inequalities in France or the US (Kaplan, Rauh, 2010)11, the 
rise in their pay – although higher than that of average salaries (Evain, 2007 ; 
Gabaix, Landier, 2008) – appears differently then generally analyzed. It may 
not only be an internal phenomenon, limited to CEOs alone, should pay be set 
by a market design (Gabaix, Landier, 2008), or by the managers’ power under 
the constraint of public outrage (Bebchuck, Fried, 2004). The great increase in 
                                                 
10 The increase in the proportion of CEOs between 1984 and 1992 is harder to analyze. It is 
known that the coding of the PCS is not very reliable for the 1980s and that there were also 
some errors in the wages reported. Those two problems make it more likely that middle and 
lower categories will be artificially represented in the top 0.1%. This growth may also be due to 
the change in the composition of the CEO pay from capital income to wages. And finally, it is 
also possible that the 1980s, a period in which free enterprise and, in particular, small firms 
were promoted, , was also a time when access to top salaries was obtained mainly through a 
position as CEO.  
11 The comparison with Kaplan and Rauh (2010) is not very easy since they use heterogeneous 
sources, but if we analyze the evolution of executives among the top 0.1%, we find that there 
is considerable stability. 
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pay among some lower management wage-earners might also have increased 
the outside options (market model) or have lowered the public outrage con-
straint (managers’ power model). 
Let us now analyze the impact of lower-rank managers on the growth in 
inequalities. Firstly, it must be noted that it is not due either to the rise in the 
number of most technical workers such as engineers, whose share stagnates 
inside the top 0.1% at a limited level of 8-10%. This second element mitigates 
the traditional interpretation in terms of biased technological progress. The rise 
in inequalities does not seem to be due to workers holding the most technical 
and scientific knowledge, as was feared in the 1960s and 1970s with the birth 
of knowledge and technical societies.  
One social category accounts for most of the rise: the administrative man-
agers (“cadres administratifs”). They accounted for a little less than 20% in the 
mid 1980s. They now represent almost 60% of the top 0.1%. The growth of 
this category between 1996 and 2007, a period in which inequalities escalated 
once again, is of 20 points. Almost half of this increase is due to the category 
“cadres d’état major”, non-executive chief officers, such as chief financial 
officers, chief commercial officers, chief administrative officers, chief human 
resources officers, etc. Unfortunately we cannot go into greater details but we 
suspect, like in the US (Zorn et alii, 2005), that the CFOs, with the financializa-
tion of the firm, are at the root of this trend among top management. The 
other half is due to lower-rank managers. We will see further in the next 
section whether this pressure on salaries exerted by lower-rank managers is a 
very general phenomenon or is due to some limited sectors of the economy.  
Graph 3. Evolution of the categories among the top 0.1% and 0.01% 
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Note: In 2007, 59% of the top 0.01% were administrative managers. Sources: Panel DADS 
(1976-2007) and France – exhaustive job files DADS (1994-2007). P stands for Panel and E 
for Exhaustive files.  
The salaries of sports and media superstars are traditionally under great me-
dia scrutiny due to the fame of the recipients. Rosen (1981) argues that the 
transformation of technology might drive a major income increase for the 
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most famous superstars, since with new technologies such as television, radio, 
CDs, etc., they can replicate their production almost at no cost and become 
famous among a wider market. In his survey of the sports economy, Andreff 
(2007) also signals the importance of the institutional frame that regulates both 
the superstar labor market and the media and advertising industries. In France, 
the deregulation of television in the 1980s enabled the multiplication of TV 
channels and competition between them for both advertising fees and broad-
casting of superstars. Therefore, superstars could extract a larger share of the 
advertising fees. In the early 1990s, the labor market was also deregulated in 
the professional sport industry. In football, the Bosman ruling in 1995 put an 
end to the limitation on the number of foreign players in European football 
clubs and therefore favored an increase in transfer fees and salaries.  
As the DADS is a wage database only, it will be difficult to give a complete 
picture of the impact of entertainment superstars on inequality. Many artists 
such as pop singers or writers are paid through copyrights. Nevertheless, we 
can at least give some insight into two categories: sportspeople and film actors. 
Sportspeople, like football players, get their base pay as a salary. And even if 
actors are also paid through copyrights and associated rights, a major part of 
their income is based on a labor contract and a wage.  
Graph 4 shows the evolution of the proportion of artists and sportspeople 
among the top 0.01%. We must remain cautious in our interpretation since the 
detailed 4-digit PCS job code is very bad before 1997, and rather bad between 
1997 and 1999 (with 40-60% of answers either missing or incorrect), becoming 
slightly better at the end of the period (missing answers drop from 34% to 
18% between 2000 and 2007). Nevertheless the more aggregate 2 numbers 
social categories code does not have such limitations and helps us to see the 
global trend.  
Given those elements, the proportion of artists among this fractile looks 
rather stable and is near 2% (Graph 4). There is a strong discontinuity in 2001 
due to the fact that before this date we cannot sum multiple jobs. Are we 
missing the real evolution since we do not have their whole income? We do 
not think so. Newspapers quite often give rankings of the best-paid actors. In 
2007, Le Figaro counts 12 actors over the threshold of 894 000 euros12. In our 
database, we count 11 actors (PCS=354C) in the top 0.01%. Although their 
income and expenditure are largely commented, artists – or at least actors – did 
not contribute much to the renewal of inequalities.  
The impact of sportspeople seems more sensible. They increase from 4% 
up to 8-10% of the top 0.01% fractile. In 2007, we count 112 persons coded 
424A professional sportspeople. Although we do not know their sport, it 
seems very likely that most of them are football players13. Indeed, the trans-
formation of their labor market enabled by the Bosman ruling seems to have 
had important effects on wages in the sports industry.  
                                                 
12 Sources: “Le palmarès 2008 des acteurs”, Le Figaro, 22/02/2008. 
13 We find several football clubs among the firms paying the highest salaries. Moreover, there 
were not so many international superstars in cycling or tennis during the period, and other 
sports like basketball or rugby pay much less in France. 
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Graph 4. Artists and sportspersons within the top 0.01% 
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Note: In 2007, 8% of the top 0.01% were sportspeople. Sources: Exhaustive job files DADS 
(1994-2007). 
 
In the end, however, although we find that superstars, or at least football 
players, do have an effect on inequality the effect remains limited compared to 
the rise in salaries of a fraction of business managers that we will try to define 
more precisely through this article.  
 
Let us explore other social characteristics such as geographical location. In 
the DADS, we also know the region where people work and, over 30 years, we 
witness a major concentration of wealth in France’s “global city”: Paris (Sassen, 
1991). The proportion of the working Rich outside the “Ile de France” Paris 
region dropped from 40% to 20% (Graph 5). There are now more working 
Rich in one department, “les Hauts de Seine”, where we find Paris business 
center “La Défense”, than in all the provinces put together. At the same time, 
the share of the Paris region among the wage-earners of the whole private 
sector remained fairly stable (35% of private sector workers).  
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Graph 5. Paris and the provinces in the top 0.1% 
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Note: In 2007, 41% of the top 0.1% worked in Paris. Sources: Panel DADS (1976-2007). 
 
IV. The impact of  finance on the renewal of  inequali-
ties 
A sector approach enables us to describe more precisely the type of busi-
ness managers that contributed the most to the increase in inequalities. It is 
also a way to address the question of the impact of finance, an industry under 
scrutiny since the crash and the following bonus outrage.  
In Graph 6, one can see important sector transformations among the top 
0.1%. Some sectors such as industry, retail and restaurants, transport and 
communication are now much less represented at the top of the wage hierar-
chy than they were 30 years ago. For instance, 38% of the top 0.1% worked in 
the industry in 1976, whereas only 14% did so in 2007.  
On the other hand, service to business, finance, and to a lesser extent enter-
tainment and other services increased among the highest-paid workers. In 
1976, 10% of the top 0.1% were in service to business and 6% in finance. In 
2007, they were 26% and 24% respectively.  
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Graph 6. Finance and other sectors in the top 0.1% 
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Note: In 2007, 26% of the top 0.1% worked in service to business. We correct the economic 
activity for holdings (cf. Appendices, sector coding). Sources: Panel DADS (1976-2007). 
At first glance, finance still seems to lag behind service to business among 
the top 0.1%. However, the increase and decrease in the different sectors at the 
top should be compared to their evolution as a whole inside the private sector. 
Thus, service to business is a sector in which the headcount has grown quite 
rapidly during the last quarter of a century, whereas the number of workers in 
finance has remained a fairly stable proportion of the private sector14. In Graph 
7, we compute the odds ratio of the percentage within the top 0.1% with the 
percentage within the rest of French private sector. We therefore check for the 
evolution of the size of the sectors inside the global population. The result is 
very striking. In the early 1980s finance industry, financial workers were twice 
as present in the top 0.1% as they were under this threshold. This ratio in-
creased smoothly in the 1980s and very sharply in the 1990s. In 2001 it peaked 
at 10, as a result of the considerable bonuses granted after the excellent year 
2000 on the market (Godechot, 2007). The 2001-2002 crisis lowered the ratio 
to 7 and the following boom led the ratio back to 10.  
Although some sectors might be over-represented among the top salaries, 
like service to business or entertainment, no overrepresentation is as important 
as that achieved by the finance industry in the last ten years. 
                                                 
14 2.8% of the private sector workforce was working in finance at the end of the 1970s. This 
proportion rose to 3.5% in the mid 1980s, declining to 2.9% in 2000 and stabilizing around 3% 
thereafter (Panel). 
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Graph 7. Overrepresentation within the top 0.1% 
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Note: In 2007, there are 10.3 times (in terms of odds ratio) more finance employees in the top 
0.1% than there are in the rest of the distribution. We correct the economic activity for 
holdings (cf. Appendices, sector coding). Sources: Panel DADS (1976-2007). 
We find a correlation between the great rise in the overrepresentation of 
finance among the top 0.1% after 1995 and the rise of inequalities in the same 
period. Therefore we can try to quantify the contribution of this sector to this 
increase. We follow here Bell and Van Reenen (2010). We calculate the contri-
bution of finance, service to business, entertainment and other sectors to the 
0.85-point increase of the wage share. We find that finance contributed to 48% 
of this rise, whereas service to business and other sectors each contributed to 
nearly 23%, and entertainment to 8% of the rise (Graph 8).  
Graph 8. Contributions to the increase of the share of the top 0.1% 
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Note: Between 1996 and 2007, the share of the top 0.1% globally increased by 0.85 points and 
the share of finance within this fractile increased by 0.40 points. We correct the economic 
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activity for holdings (cf. Appendices, sector coding). Sources: France – exhaustive job files 
DADS (1994-2007). 
When we move into the top 0.01%, we find that finance makes a contribu-
tion of 57% to the increase in the share of the working Rich (Table 1). At the 
end of the period, finance constitutes 37% of the headcount of the top 0.01%, 
which are 19.4 times more present at this level than below. Overrepresentation 
of this sector in that fractile is much higher than that of service to business 
(2.3) or entertainment (6.7) (Table A5). Moreover, we must not forget that we 
have a small discontinuity in 2001 in our series of exhaustive files that may lead 
us to overestimate the increase between 1996 and 2007 (cf. Table A4) and to 
underestimate the impact of finance on this increase. When we look at compu-
tation with the panel, finance makes a greater contribution to the increase in 
the top fractiles between 47 and 70% (Table 1).  
Table 1. Contribution of finance to the increase in the share of the top 
fractiles 
  Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% 
France Panel Share in 1996 26.45% 5.74% 1.20% 0.27% 
 Share in 2007 27.74% 7.06% 2.01% 0.65% 
 Increase in the share 1.29% 1.32% 0.81% 0.38% 
 
Contribution of finance 
to this increase 51% 47% 57% 69% 
France Exhaustive files Share in 1996 25.67% 5.43% 1.10% 0.23% 
 Share in 2007 27. 70% 6.97% 1.95% 0.60% 
 Increase in the share 2.03% 1.91% 0.85% 0.38% 
 
Contribution of finance 
to this increase 33% 39% 48% 57% 
UK 1998-2008 Increase in the share 3.00% 1.80% - - 
(Bell and Van Reenen, 
2010, Table 3 - ASHE) 
Contribution of finance 
to this increase  73% 72% - - 
Note: Between 1996 and 2007, according to the panel, the share of the top 10% globally 
increased by 1.29 point and the share of finance within this fractile contributed to 51% of this 
increase. Sources: France – exhaustive job files DADS (1994-2007). 
When we compare these with figures from Bell and Van Reenen (2010), we 
find a similar phenomenon. In both countries, finance played a major role in 
the renewal of wage inequalities. Two differences must be noted. Both the 
rhythm of increase in inequalities and the contribution of finance to this 
phenomenon seem to be 1.5-2 times as high in United Kingdom than in 
France. The considerable difference in the size of the two financial centers, 
Paris and London, probably accounts for this difference15.  
Finance therefore appears to have played a major role in the renewal of 
wage inequalities in France. How has this trend arisen? Has pay in finance been 
growing at all levels compared with the rest of the economy? Or is the devia-
tion due to some levels of the income distribution?  
On average, finance workers were paid 43% more at the end of the 1970s. 
They were paid 73% more at the end of the 2000s. However, this moderate 
growth in relative income in finance hides very heterogeneous situations at 
different thresholds of the distribution (Graph 9). The P10 ratio 
                                                 
15 It should be noted that when we do the same analysis on the Paris Region only, we find that 
the rate of increase in inequality and the contribution of finance to this increase are very similar 
to the situation in the United Kingdom. 
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(P10Finance/P10Non-finance) declined during the period from 1.8 to 1.5. The lower 
end of the distribution in finance is now much less favored than it was previ-
ously. The P25 ratio remains fairly stable between 1.5 and 1.6. The P50 ratio 
makes a small increase and the P90 and P95 are in line with the average ratio. 
However, when we move to the P99 ratio, we see a very sharp rise from 1.3 to 
2.3. Therefore, the contribution of finance to the renewal of French inequali-
ties is mainly due to a sharp increase in wages at the upper end of the financial 
wage distribution and not to a general increase. 
Graph 9. Ratios between finance and non-finance for different thresh-
olds of the distribution (panel) 
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Note: In 2007, the P99 threshold in finance was 2.28 higher than the P99 threshold outside 
finance. Sources: Panel DADS (1976-2007). 
In fact, inequalities within the financial industry grew at a very rapid rate 
during  the latter 12 years, especially during the late 1990s when prices and 
volume increased substantially on the stock exchange (Graph 10). The top 1% 
share grew from 6% to 10%. The 2002 recession on the market (visible in 2003 
bonuses paid for the year before) mainly led to a stabilization of this new 
sharing. The new financial euphoria of the mid-2000s led to another increase in 
inequalities. In less then ten years French finance saw an increase in inequalities 
(with the top 1% rising from 6% to 12% of the total wages) similar in scale to 
that experienced by the whole of the United States during a period of over 35 
years (with the top 1% of wages going from 6% to 12% of the total wages 
between 1965 and 2000, Piketty, Saez, 2003). Although we have two different 
phenomena, with a single sector on the one hand and a global wage-earner 
society on the other, this comparison at least shows the great speed of the 
increase in inequality in French financial sector. We therefore confirm the 
amplitude of a trend that we had previously detected for France’s three main 
banks (Godechot, Fleury, 2005) on the basis of their Bilans Sociaux French 
compulsory social reports. 
 16 
Graph 10. Evolution of the share of the top 1% and the top 0.1% in the 
financial sector 
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Note: In 2007, in Finance, the F99-100 fractile was paid 12.4% of the salaries. Sources: France 
– exhaustive job files DADS (1994-2007), Finance sector only.  
Who is responsible for the increase in inequalities within the finance indus-
try? Following Kaplan and Rauh (2010), we would expect the employees who 
are most tied to the financial markets to be linked to this phenomenon. In 
2003, INSEE reformed its PCS code and introduced a new category, financial 
market managers (cadres des marchés financiers), among which we find traders, 
salespeople, financial analysts, portfolio managers, brokers, financial engineers 
and risk managers. The category reflects quite well what people on the market 
generally call “front offices” (Godechot, 2001). This group is very likely to 
capture the impact of the growth of financial markets on wages. Unfortunately 
the category does not allow close scrutiny of the latter 12 years and does not 
enable us to view the great boom of the financial markets during the second 
half of the 1990s (cf. Graph 13). Second, due to its novelty, firms might not be 
very used to the new code for people that were traditionally coded as bank 
managers (cadres de banque). Third, we do not know if heads of trading rooms 
and heads of desks, the highest-paid employees on the financial markets 
(Godechot, 2007), are always coded so. Despite its limitations, the category is a 
good proxy for the recent impact of the financial market (with maybe a little 
underestimation of the actual scope). 
During the latter five years, the importance of this category grew in the frac-
tiles of the financial sector. They made up 20.6% of the top 1% in finance. 
They represented 27.8% in 2007 (Table 2). The same growing trend is observ-
able within the French private sector. At the end of the period, market manag-
ers accounted for 13% of the top 0.01% – that is, more than professional 
sportspeople – and were 150 times more present than in the rest of society. 
Therefore, although we do not have much historical depth, the impact of 
market managers on the 2005-2007 rise in inequalities suggests that it is mainly 
the boom of financial market activity since the mid-1990s that fueled inequality 
in finance. 
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Table 2. Importance of market managers among top fractiles 
Domain Year Top 0.01% Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 10% All N 
Finance only 2003 - 28.4% 20.6% 9.1% 1.674% 6801 
 2004 - 22.6% 21.5% 9.0% 1.656% 6803 
 2005 - 26.9% 23.1% 9.6% 1.843% 7697 
 2006 - 27.3% 25.3% 10.6% 1.970% 8584 
 2007 - 30.8% 27.8% 11.6% 2.097% 9334 
France 2003 8.0% 4.2% 1.8% 0.51% 0.078% 8923 
 2004 9.0% 4.8% 1.9% 0.50% 0.073% 8624 
 2005 8.1% 5.3% 2.0% 0.53% 0.078% 9872 
 2006 9.0% 6.4% 2.2% 0.56% 0.081% 10758 
 2007 13.0% 7.4% 2.5% 0.59% 0.084% 11368 
Note: In 2007, 30.8% of the top 0.1% finance wage-earners and 7.4% of the top 0.1% private 
sector wage-earners were market managers (PCS=376A). Sources: France – exhaustive job files 
DADS (2003-2007), Finance sector only.  
To what extent is this very fast-growing inequality visible to people working 
in the financial sector? Do those earning normal salaries and high-end salaries 
work in the same environment and find themselves in a situation where they 
will have to cooperate, generating possible frustrations? Or are high-end 
salaries concentrated in very specific firms, like hedge funds, where they 
constitute a sort of cooperative of working Rich. In order to answer this 
question, we decompose the variance both within and between financial units16 
(Graph A1). Results show that inequalities have mostly been growing within 
units rather than between units. As Graph 9 also shows, finance was once a 
sector that was both well paid and relatively egalitarian, with a pay grid rather 
similar, in its philosophy, to that of civil servants. It is now at the forefront of 
inequality. The change occurred within a few years, in the middle of the 1990s, 
and now coworkers separated by tremendous inequalities share the same 
buildings. We could expect this type of inequality to lead to some form of 
relative frustration. Although no sign of major protest (such as strikes) were 
particularly visible within the French banking system, we might see some 
consequences in the recurrent hesitation in this industry between two types of 
development: integration of financial activities and retail banking, or separation 
of those two components (Lordon, 2002). The root of this hesitation may be 
found in the profound inequalities that separate the two branches of finance. 
Elements of  interpretation 
Finally, Graph 12, which compares the evolution of top salaries, enables us 
to sum up some of our main findings. In the graph, we analyze the evolution 
of the top 100 finance managers (people working in finance sector as “cadres”), 
the top 100 non-finance and non-entertainment managers, the top 100 CEOs, 
the top 25 sportspersons, and the top 20 wage-earners in movies, TV and the 
video sector (most of whom were actors). Between 1996 and 2007, wages 
increased by 1.5 in this latter group, by 3.3 in sports and among the top CEOs, 
by 3.6 among the top non-finance managers, and by 8.7 among the top 100 
finance managers. One will find similar series in appendices for the top 1000 
                                                 
16 The notion of a unit of a firm (établissement) is based on geographical addresses. The firm is a 
juridical notion. A firm may have one or more units. 
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based on the panel (Graph A2), showing how finance, even at the broader level 
of the top 1000, happened to catch up with the top 1000 CEOs and the top 
1000 non-finance managers and managed to leave behind the top 1000 enter-
tainment stars.  
Graphe 12. Evolution of the top wages for several well-known jobs. 
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Note: In 2007, the top 100 Finance managers were paid 4,652,388 euros. Evolutions are in 
2007 constant euros. Sources: France – exhaustive job files DADS (1994-2007).  
Therefore, the most scrutinized highly-paid professionals, such as CEOs 
and entertainment superstars, are not the most responsible for the increase in 
inequalities in comparison with finance managers, in particular heads of desks 
and heads of trading rooms.  
Several elements of interpretation have been provided in order to explain 
this extraordinary wage trend in the financial industry. The importance of 
human capital has been researched both in Philippon and Resheff (2009) for 
the US, and in Godechot (forthcoming) for one of France’s main banks. 
Despite the importance of diplomas at the core of the financial markets, even 
very detailed diploma variables in traditional wage equations fail to explain the 
wage structure or its evolution. 
A great deal of recent research links the way in which compensation in the 
financial industry has evolved with the evolution of the size of activity (Me-
unier, 2007, Kaplan, Rauh, 2010, Célérier, 2010). Kaplan and Rauh (2010) 
therefore give an impressive series on the rise in the amount under manage-
ment in hedge funds, evolving from 20 billion in 1986 to 1 trillion in 2004.  
Although the volume of shares exchanged on the Paris stock market 
(Graph 13) may not be fully representative of the increase in the size of finan-
cial activity – missing over-the-counter, fixed-income or foreign financial 
products – it is at first glance a reasonably good approximation of investment 
bank activity, which, in the end, is mainly an activity of intermediation in 
France (brokering, equity derivatives pricing and marketing, etc.). This graph 
clearly shows how financial activity boomed at a very rapid rate during three 
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periods: 1984-1987 (+70% per year), 1995-2000 (+50% per year) and 2004-
2007 (+ 25% per year).  
If we compare the evolution of the top 100 finance managers during the last 
12 years with our volume index, results are very striking17. Between 1995 and 
2006, volume rose by 8.85. During the same period, the top 100 finance 
managers’ wages increased by 8.26. The fit of the two curbs, although not 
perfect, is nevertheless impressive18.  
Graph 13. Volume of shares exchanged on the Parisian stock-market and 
the top 100 finance managers’ pay. 
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Note: In 2006, 1,712,090 million euros’ worth of shares were exchanged on the Paris market. 
In 2006 (that is, in 2007 for 2006 activity), the top 100 finance managers were granted 
4,652,387 euros.  
* We rescale the top 100 finance managers curb a) in year n-1 as bonus are generally in year n 
for the year n-1 activity, b) so that the two curbs share in 1995 the same reference point. 
Sources: France – exhaustive job files DADS (1994-2007) and Euronext, Euronext Fact Book, 
Historical series - Turnover. http://www.euronext.com/editorial/wide/editorial-20786-
EN.html  
Several interpretations of such a strong correlation (r=0.92) are possible. 
First, it must be acknowledged that this correlation of pay with an exogenous 
observable variable enables us to reject a traditional explanation in terms of 
incentives in a principle-agent framework. If an agent’s pay is correctly moni-
tored by the principle it should be tied to the agent’s effort and not to an 
exogenous form of chance like the turnover on financial markets, an indicator 
for which financial managers can hardly be said to be responsible. Therefore, 
any observable form of exogenous chance should be discounted from the 
incentive indicator (Holmstrom, 1981). Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) uses 
this feature in order to test the efficiency of CEO pay. They conclude that 
                                                 
17 The effect of the first boom of the 1980s on compensations is harder to detect for the 
following reasons: financial markets represented only a small fraction of the finance activities at 
that time, the panel at 1/24th of the population lacks precision and a great part of these 
activities were then carried out by the Agents de change, traditional French brokers and their 
employees, who were largely paid via heterodox means (Godechot, Lagneau-Ymonet, 2009). 
18 If we regress the logarithm of the top 100 average wages on the logarithm of volume index 
we find a R2 of 85% and a very significant coefficient of 0.9. 
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poorly-monitored CEO are likely to be rewarded for unexpected luck such as 
an increase in petroleum in the oil industry. Here the strong correlation be-
tween global volume and top compensations in finance leans in the same 
direction. At the very least, it shows that the evolution of top compensations 
are difficult to understand within a classical principal-agent framework. 
Nevertheless, the traditional but intriguing correlation between pay and size 
was recently given a different explanation that could be relevant for financial 
market managers. Gabaix and Landier (2008) explain how the heterogeneity of 
CEO talent may be multiplied by a skewed distribution of volume. They 
develop a model where the biggest firm hires the best CEO in order to maxi-
mize the impact of the CEO for its shareholders. In this model, the best CEO 
does not need to be a superhero but only to be very slightly better than the 
250th CEO (that is to have an impact of only 0.016% more than the 250th 
firm’s capitalization) in order to get, due to the skewness of the distribution of 
company size, a multiple of its salary (for instance 5 times more in their calibra-
tion). In their model, while the synchronic relation between logarithm of pay 
and logarithm of size is only of 1/3, it increases to 1 in a diachronic approach. 
This mechanism was also invoked for financial labor markets by several 
authors (Meunier, 2007, Kaplan, Rauh, 2010), and Célérier developed a model 
(2010) based partially on this idea. In the same spirit, if a star trader can get 
5.1% return on equity instead of 5.0% as an ordinary trader, he will be matched 
to the biggest portfolio and will get an extra bonus of 0.1% of the size of the 
portfolio (for instance: 1 million euros more if he is matched to a 1-billion-
euro portfolio). If we follow this perfect market mechanism of matching of 
size and talent, the hierarchy of pay both within and between sectors follows 
only a natural, independent hierarchy of talent. Pay is distorted by the skewness 
of the distribution of volume but we cannot talk of rents. The mechanism 
nevertheless supposes very strong conditions: that is, both perfect mobility 
within and between sectors and perfect knowledge of the hierarchy of talent. 
In order to put this idea to the test, let us compare the evolution of manag-
ers’ rank and salary during the 1996-2001 boom. Let us imagine that before the 
boom, in 1996, the best managers were assigned to the biggest project in an 
assortative matching process similar to that described by Gabaix and Landier. 
The boom in finance, and moreover the increase in the size of financial pro-
jects, should increase pay in finance but also attract a fair amount of non-
finance managers in order for them to work on bigger projects and earn more. 
Therefore salary increases and evolution of salary rank should be the same for 
both finance and non-finance top managers.  
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Table 3. The fate of 1996 top 10% of managers in 2001 
 Evolution 
Mean  
(sd) N 
 
In 1996, managers working in 
non-finance in 1996 
94.94 
(2.88) 3178 
Ranks of 1996 top 10% 
In 2001, managers working in 
non-finance in 1996 
86.47 
(19.50) 3178 
 In 1996, managers working in 
finance in 1996 
95.50 
(2.94) 369 
 
In 2001, managers working in 
finance in 1996 
88.52 
(19.26) 369 
 
In 1996, managers working in 
non-finance in 1996 
113 126 € 
(43 421) 3178 
Wages of 1996 top 10% 
In 2001, managers working in 
non-finance in 1996 
126 914 € 
(75 858) 3178 
 In 1996, managers working in 
finance in 1996 
125 724 € 
(66 125) 369 
 
In 2001, managers working in 
finance in 1996 
174 582 € 
(165 878) 369 
 
1996 top 10%, managers working 
in non-finance in 1996 
1.1% 
(0.105) 3178 
Moving from non-finance 
to finance (5 years later) 
1996 bottom 90%, managers 
working in non-finance in 1996 
1.1% 
(0.104) 29103 
 
1991 top 10%, managers working 
in non-finance in 1991 
1.7% 
(0.129) 2641 
Increase of pay between  
managers working in non-finance 
in 1996 
13%  
(0.49) 3178 
1996 and 2001 for the 
1996 top 10% 
managers working in finance in 
1996 
38%  
(0.93) 369 
Note: Thanks to the panel, we can study here the population of managers (entertainment 
sector excluded) working both in year t and year t+5 in order to analyze individual evolution. 
We rank this population both in time t and t+5 and isolate the top 10% in t. Sources: Panel 
DADS (1976-2007). 
Table 3 shows that among the 1996 top 10% of managers, salaries and 
ranks, although a little higher, were quite close. Nevertheless, despite the 1996-
2001 boom in financial activities very few top managers (1.1%) moved from 
non-finance to finance. Contrary to the assortative matching hypothesis, this 
proportion is similar to that of the rest of the distribution of managers and 
inferior to the 1991-1996 period, when finance was not booming in France. As 
a thought experiment, we simulated the mobility from non-finance to finance 
if 1996 salary ranks were to be maintained in 2001. In such a case, 10% of non-
finance top managers would have moved to finance instead of 1.1%, and 89% 
of 1996 finance top managers would have moved to non-finance instead of 
15%. As a result of this low mobility, 1996 non-finance top managers received 
an average 13% individual wage increase while 1996 finance managers received 
a 38% wage increase. If we consider the two populations as equally talented in 
1996, then the 25% extra salary increase for 1996 finance workers can be 
considered as a rent that is not due to extra talent. 
As finance managers “are largely ‘made’ by circumstance rather than ‘born’ 
to work on Wall Street” (Oyer, 2008) than we can conserve the idea that the 
size of financial activity is responsible for the increase in pay without plugging 
it with a natural and intangible hierarchy of talents. Talent may not only be 
natural, observed and eventually revealed by the financial industry (Célérier, 
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2010) but also acquired on the job19. In previous work (Godechot, 2007, 2008), 
we develop a model of financial activities where financial operatives appropri-
ate the key assets of the firm and can threaten to move those assets to a 
competitor in the same sector. Those assets can be traditional human sector-
specific capital such as knowledge and know-how, but we must also include 
more material assets such as software and databases, as well as social capital 
such as  customer relations or productive teams. In our 2008 paper, we analyze 
in detail a case of “hold-up”. In a 2001 wage renegotiation, the head of a 
trading room and his deputy were granted 10 and 7 million euros respectively 
by effectively threatening to move their whole teams and therefore the core of 
the firm’s financial activity to a competitor. Although those two individuals 
might be very talented, what was at stake in this wage renegotiation was not 
their initial talent but their on-the-job accumulated social capital that enabled 
them to expropriate part of the firm’s assets. The specificity of finance may not 
be its greater sensitivity to talent (Célérier, 2010) but rather the fact that 
physical property rights, intellectual property rights such as patents, and labor 
contract devices like non-compete clauses are much less effective at protecting 
the firms’ assets against worker appropriation.  
Therefore, in such a model, if the accumulation of movable assets allows a 
financial worker to capture a fraction of financial activity, the growth of the 
latter leads to a growth in his pay. We can therefore find an explanation of the 
trend in finance pay without considering that the financial elites are the natural 
elite of society. 
Conclusion 
France has experienced a strong increase in inequalities over the last 12 
years. Half of the increase of the share of the top 0.1% is due to an increase in 
pay among top finance managers. On the other hand, CEOs and entertainment 
superstars did not seem to play a major role in the increase in inequalities.  
The interpretation of this trend is only just beginning. We nevertheless find 
a striking correlation between the top 100 finance managers’ pay and turnover 
on the Paris stock market. The relationship between the size of financial 
activity and pay may not be only due to a multiplicative effect of size on initial 
talent but also to the fact that workers in finance can appropriate a share of the 
firm’s assets, assets which have been growing rapidly over the last twelve years. 
Although the basic model linking size of financial activity and pay might be 
relatively similar in the two cases, more work is needed in order to separate the 
contribution of initial talent and acquired assets. This research program has an 
obvious policy implication. With the 2008 financial crisis, some social analysts 
pleaded in favor of a tax on financial wages, and the UK and France have 
experimented with this tax for a limited time. In this debate, taxing talent or 
taxing rents does not have the same political significance.  
It should also be noted that the taxation of finance workers and taxation of 
high incomes has received contradictory attention in the public debate. France, 
during the last decade, as in many developed countries, has been lowering the 
                                                 
19 Célérier builds a model where finance is a sector more sensitive to talent. Talent is discov-
ered after the first working period. In the model, this talent can either be an initial talent that is 
revealed or on-the-job acquired talent. Nevertheless in her argumentation Célérier favors the 
first hypothesis. 
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tax rates for the highest incomes, after some consideration of the positive 
effects of those elites on overall activity. At the same time, CEOs during the 
whole decade, finance workers after 2007, and sportspeople after the 2010 
world cup defeat, have been widely criticized. Both the meritocratic character 
of their pay and the usefulness of their economic role has been subject to 
debate. It should be noted that those categories are not marginal among top 
wages in France. In the top 0.01% of wages for 2007, we find nearly 40% of 
finance workers, 20% of CEOs and 10% of sportspeople. Taxing this fractile 
of salary more would be another way (perhaps more easily achieved than a 
sectorial tax) to redistribute those salaries, which more and more citizens 
consider as rents. 
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Appendices 
Table A1. Thresholds, means and standard estimates of yearly gross wages for different fractiles of the distribution (Panel). Constant 2007 
euros. 
Year Selection 
threshold 
F00-90 
Mean 
F00-90 
Std 
P90 F90-95 
Mean 
F90-95 
Std 
P95 F95-99 
Mean 
F95-99 Std P99 F99-99.9 
Mean 
F99-99.9 
Std 
P99.9 F99.9-
99.99 
Mean 
F99.9-
99.99 Std 
P99.99 F99.99-100 
Mean 
F99.99-100 
Std 
All Mean All Std N 
1976 4,528 €  16,049 €  6,544 €  32,673 €  37,158 €  3,054 €  43,445 €  56,553 €  10,538 €  83,079 €  110,412 €  24,100 €  183,050 €  230,117 €  41,955 €  354,629 €  617,527 €  491,825 €  19,827 €  17,485 €  535 292 
1977 4,851 €  16,573 €  6,550 €  33,243 €  37,755 €  3,069 €  44,037 €  56,786 €  10,269 €  82,927 €  107,797 €  20,557 €  167,550 €  208,334 €  36,030 €  329,028 €  454,875 €  206,709 €  20,279 €  15,915 €  545 229 
1978 5,234 €  17,305 €  6,729 €  34,487 €  39,164 €  3,175 €  45,669 €  58,718 €  10,501 €  85,336 €  110,183 €  20,978 €  170,093 €  204,923 €  30,097 €  300,252 €  410,739 €  167,556 €  21,099 €  16,009 €  534 515 
1979 5,314 €  17,482 €  6,721 €  34,543 €  39,130 €  3,125 €  45,579 €  58,433 €  10,325 €  84,266 €  109,577 €  21,338 €  172,087 €  212,782 €  33,001 €  306,318 €  411,695 €  161,894 €  21,246 €  15,989 €  549 794 
1980 5,412 €  17,716 €  6,827 €  34,964 €  39,597 €  3,163 €  46,128 €  59,227 €  10,483 €  85,500 €  110,873 €  21,897 €  174,628 €  211,916 €  30,733 €  314,561 €  413,035 €  131,824 €  21,524 €  16,125 €  542 101 
1982 5,805 €  18,066 €  6,889 €  35,752 €  40,517 €  3,281 €  47,276 €  60,395 €  10,438 €  86,300 €  111,769 €  22,072 €  177,507 €  223,168 €  42,255 €  355,700 €  711,491 €  484,745 €  21,980 €  18,010 €  521 238 
1984 6,026 €  18,366 €  6,934 €  36,396 €  41,317 €  3,342 €  48,160 €  61,777 €  10,805 €  88,954 €  115,585 €  23,058 €  183,025 €  233,406 €  45,153 €  368,471 €  753,563 €  581,191 €  22,393 €  18,849 €  485 279 
1985 6,157 €  18,638 €  7,072 €  37,181 €  42,260 €  3,420 €  49,279 €  62,977 €  10,841 €  89,753 €  115,878 €  22,529 €  180,719 €  227,480 €  40,056 €  348,280 €  531,495 €  239,727 €  22,708 €  17,397 €  479 365 
1986 6,253 €  18,961 €  7,269 €  38,123 €  43,435 €  3,595 €  50,847 €  65,095 €  11,254 €  92,893 €  121,337 €  24,704 €  195,690 €  249,900 €  51,582 €  404,474 €  745,958 €  504,037 €  23,233 €  19,471 €  483 321 
1987 6,307 €  19,089 €  7,394 €  38,629 €  43,988 €  3,600 €  51,364 €  65,847 €  11,509 €  94,598 €  123,501 €  24,727 €  195,460 €  240,099 €  39,109 €  364,627 €  514,812 €  208,007 €  23,393 €  18,248 €  486 983 
1988 6,311 €  19,079 €  7,524 €  38,905 €  44,345 €  3,683 €  51,875 €  66,712 €  11,716 €  95,677 €  125,079 €  25,864 €  201,399 €  251,313 €  44,367 €  396,400 €  598,328 €  232,914 €  23,469 €  18,901 €  484 805 
1989 6,344 €  19,359 €  7,725 €  39,774 €  45,336 €  3,743 €  52,980 €  68,136 €  12,068 €  98,334 €  128,496 €  25,686 €  201,628 €  252,274 €  47,804 €  414,841 €  544,504 €  108,896 €  23,854 €  19,020 €  508 852 
1991 6,504 €  19,919 €  7,940 €  40,896 €  46,526 €  3,779 €  54,255 €  69,348 €  11,944 €  99,056 €  129,497 €  26,196 €  206,521 €  258,354 €  48,700 €  423,901 €  582,962 €  188,851 €  24,484 €  19,450 €  527 896 
1992 6,604 €  20,131 €  8,004 €  41,173 €  46,757 €  3,732 €  54,359 €  69,232 €  11,620 €  98,043 €  128,048 €  25,683 €  201,512 €  254,962 €  49,264 €  412,031 €  581,312 €  181,237 €  24,666 €  19,304 €  534 834 
1993 6,637 €  20,286 €  8,172 €  42,011 €  47,865 €  3,909 €  55,847 €  70,808 €  11,606 €  99,649 €  129,206 €  25,427 €  202,710 €  259,364 €  54,160 €  433,983 €  666,159 €  275,301 €  24,946 €  20,016 €  518 688 
1994 6,671 €  20,139 €  8,255 €  41,908 €  47,697 €  3,838 €  55,523 €  70,141 €  11,376 €  98,318 €  127,875 €  25,749 €  205,394 €  264,314 €  56,028 €  445,012 €  665,313 €  314,843 €  24,771 €  20,064 €  513 955 
1995 6,757 €  20,319 €  8,202 €  41,997 €  47,754 €  3,854 €  55,550 €  70,256 €  11,422 €  98,942 €  127,945 €  24,719 €  202,017 €  259,720 €  47,794 €  407,830 €  600,817 €  223,798 €  24,931 €  19,625 €  522 383 
1996 6,864 €  20,301 €  8,135 €  41,688 €  47,331 €  3,790 €  55,021 €  69,439 €  11,240 €  97,329 €  125,219 €  24,183 €  197,712 €  257,542 €  54,421 €  433,172 €  669,643 €  338,505 €  24,841 €  19,728 €  527 345 
1997 6,979 €  20,324 €  8,149 €  41,750 €  47,316 €  3,737 €  54,892 €  69,366 €  11,215 €  97,350 €  126,270 €  25,282 €  200,441 €  264,106 €  56,490 €  437,931 €  675,288 €  254,620 €  24,875 €  19,758 €  533 517 
1998 7,138 €  20,471 €  8,157 €  42,016 €  47,651 €  3,797 €  55,347 €  70,067 €  11,485 €  98,606 €  129,096 €  26,968 €  210,077 €  282,243 €  68,806 €  505,238 €  758,573 €  288,755 €  25,101 €  20,541 €  551 889 
1999 7,218 €  20,247 €  8,184 €  42,531 €  48,456 €  3,949 €  56,492 €  71,803 €  12,114 €  102,520 €  136,022 €  29,918 €  229,015 €  316,474 €  80,274 €  562,880 €  821,373 €  290,008 €  25,109 €  21,821 €  533 422 
2000 7,256 €  20,287 €  8,196 €  42,767 €  48,739 €  3,977 €  56,822 €  72,463 €  12,427 €  103,843 €  138,010 €  30,476 €  234,457 €  320,895 €  82,686 €  589,959 €  964,457 €  507,948 €  25,223 €  23,009 €  560 247 
2001 7,396 €  20,655 €  8,324 €  43,691 €  49,894 €  4,131 €  58,248 €  74,465 €  12,899 €  107,180 €  143,404 €  33,091 €  252,082 €  351,439 €  92,246 €  655,473 €   1,018,925 € 599,667 €  25,773 €  24,310 €  580 405 
2002 7,494 €  21,011 €  8,383 €  43,937 €  49,982 €  4,045 €  58,175 €  74,045 €  12,611 €  106,329 €  142,049 €  32,540 €  247,598 €  350,434 €  96,936 €  658,239 €   1,085,736 € 639,644 €  26,074 €  24,529 €  1 182 443 
2003 7,626 €  21,063 €  8,403 €  43,920 €  49,885 €  4,012 €  58,056 €  73,710 €  12,495 €  105,592 €  141,749 €  32,896 €  245,381 €  336,867 €  87,124 €  612,332 €   1,141,530 € 864,798 €  26,093 €  25,206 €  1 186 862 
2004 7,884 €  21,205 €  8,365 €  44,103 €  50,102 €  4,035 €  58,333 €  74,125 €  12,631 €  106,543 €  143,537 €  34,057 €  253,278 €  349,348 €  91,678 €  653,136 €   1,256,144 € 980,544 €  26,287 €  26,395 €  1 174 623 
2005 7,746 €  21,834 €  8,680 €  45,465 €  51,616 €  4,146 €  60,101 €  76,609 €  13,245 €  110,894 €  149,955 €  36,497 €  266,729 €  378,316 €  106,398 €  722,456 €   1,222,500 € 723,692 €  27,108 €  26,324 €  1 178 154 
2006 7,524 €  21,960 €  8,769 €  45,531 €  51,674 €  4,116 €  60,052 €  76,729 €  13,441 €  111,467 €  152,005 €  37,980 €  273,951 €  389,019 €  108,801 €  748,510 €   1,752,971 €  3,273,959 € 27,311 €  43,337 €  1 245 212 
2007 7,603 €  22,314 €  8,898 €  46,237 €  52,454 €  4,174 €  61,014 €  78,060 €  13,723 €  113,781 €  155,959 €  39,325 €  285,527 €  420,043 €  128,585 €  835,934 €   1,810,961 €  2,287,504 € 27,790 €  37,294 €  1 269 372 
 
Table A2. Table A1. Thresholds, means and standard estimates of yearly gross wages for different fractiles of the distribution (Exhaustive files). 
Constant 2007 euros. 
Year 
Selection 
threshold 
F00-90 
Mean 
F00-90 
Std P90 
F90-95 
Mean 
F90-95 
Std P95 
F95-99 
Mean F95-99 Std P99 
F99-99.9 
Mean 
F99-99.9 
Std P99.9 
F99.9-
99.99 
Mean 
F99.9-
99.99 Std P99.99 
F99.99-100 
Mean 
F99.99-100 
Std All Mean All Std N 
1994 6,670 € 20,913 € 8,200 € 42,431 € 48,062 € 3,764 € 55,753 € 69,860 € 11,028 € 97,262 € 124,806 € 23,670 € 195,372 € 247,703 € 47,337 € 392,474 € 594,876 € 493,287 € 25,425 € 19,651 € 11 439 684 
1995 6,757 € 21,135 € 8,186 € 42,642 € 48,251 € 3,766 € 55,850 € 70,073 € 10,990 € 97,298 € 124,099 € 23,116 € 192,742 € 245,887 € 47,083 € 389,209 € 570,918 € 280,595 € 25,632 € 19,078 € 11 253 327 
1996 6,864 € 21,183 € 8,148 € 42,581 € 48,111 € 3,718 € 55,617 € 69,668 € 10,893 € 96,692 € 123,473 € 23,204 € 192,977 € 247,821 € 48,920 € 396,729 € 580,261 € 267,212 € 25,650 € 19,009 € 11 233 725 
1997 6,979 € 21,189 € 8,172 € 42,611 € 48,108 € 3,717 € 55,590 € 69,624 € 10,896 € 96,708 € 124,334 € 24,126 € 196,959 € 256,797 € 53,920 € 424,775 € 640,994 € 289,023 € 25,674 € 19,386 € 11 429 251 
1998 6,931 € 21,043 € 8,116 € 42,318 € 47,777 € 3,692 € 55,208 € 69,145 € 10,821 € 96,043 € 123,479 € 23,960 € 195,604 € 255,030 € 53,549 € 421,853 € 636,584 € 287,034 € 25,498 € 19,253 € 11 429 251 
1999 7,218 € 21,427 € 8,369 € 43,430 € 49,174 € 3,849 € 56,978 € 71,621 € 11,502 € 100,559 € 131,037 € 27,210 € 216,320 € 296,305 € 74,997 € 538,701 € 860,305 € 426,292 € 26,140 € 21,507 € 11 942 916 
2000 7,256 € 21,191 € 8,388 € 43,284 € 49,046 € 3,850 € 56,833 € 71,715 € 11,702 € 101,263 € 133,220 € 29,001 € 225,847 € 314,418 € 83,948 € 597,029 € 977,859 € 506,115 € 25,973 € 22,562 € 12 400 411 
2001 7,395 € 21,526 € 8,429 € 44,039 € 49,981 € 3,969 € 58,014 € 73,493 € 12,275 € 104,654 € 139,155 € 31,411 € 240,293 € 341,918 € 96,814 € 653,796 € 985,567 € 411,276 € 26,471 € 23,216 € 12 670 098 
2001 7,395 € 21,674 € 8,841 € 45,521 € 51,794 € 4,190 € 60,291 € 76,686 € 13,020 € 109,881 € 146,385 € 33,065 € 252,935 € 356,328 € 98,404 € 673,132 €  1,057,729 € 604,312 € 26,908 € 24,905 € 15 146 231 
2002 7,495 € 21,956 € 8,900 € 45,939 € 52,175 € 4,152 € 60,590 € 76,823 € 12,906 € 109,805 € 146,280 € 33,016 € 251,250 € 350,605 € 94,937 € 661,717 €  1,158,246 € 870,210 € 27,190 € 26,013 € 15 160 086 
2003 7,627 € 21,640 € 9,083 € 46,378 € 52,503 € 4,044 € 60,640 € 76,147 € 12,349 € 107,805 € 143,795 € 32,749 € 247,394 € 340,690 € 86,488 € 619,859 €  1,143,812 € 975,510 € 26,863 € 26,148 € 16 066 991 
2004 7,883 € 21,723 € 8,774 € 45,291 € 51,363 € 4,052 € 59,584 € 75,486 € 12,697 € 108,083 € 144,996 € 33,361 € 250,379 € 350,292 € 94,943 € 660,466 €  1,232,770 €  1,113,680 € 26,882 € 27,062 € 15 950 337 
2005 7,747 € 21,772 € 8,813 € 45,481 € 51,598 € 4,087 € 59,905 € 76,126 € 12,992 € 109,528 € 147,842 € 34,910 € 259,262 € 366,355 € 102,018 € 701,003 €  1,281,250 €  1,336,719 € 27,009 € 28,642 € 16 321 586 
2006 7,525 € 21,975 € 8,967 € 45,896 € 52,019 € 4,099 € 60,358 € 76,777 € 13,181 € 110,839 € 150,363 € 36,323 € 266,399 € 378,753 € 108,988 € 739,876 €  1,421,522 €  1,647,971 € 27,286 € 31,147 € 16 724 583 
2007 7,604 € 22,396 € 9,104 € 46,708 € 52,935 € 4,179 € 61,452 € 78,312 € 13,585 € 113,613 € 155,574 € 39,058 € 282,787 € 414,348 € 131,333 € 866,596 €  1,682,324 €  1,631,479 € 27,878 € 33,067 € 16 921 903 
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Table A3. Share of the total gross wage of different fractiles (Panel) 
Year  F0-90   F90-95   F95-99   F99-99.9  F99.90-99.99 F99.99-100.0 
1976 72.85% 9.37% 11.41% 5.01% 1.05% 0.31% 
1977 73.55% 9.31% 11.20% 4.78% 0.93% 0.23% 
1978 73.82% 9.28% 11.13% 4.70% 0.87% 0.20% 
1979 74.05% 9.21% 11.00% 4.64% 0.90% 0.19% 
1980 74.08% 9.20% 11.01% 4.64% 0.89% 0.19% 
1982 73.97% 9.22% 10.99% 4.58% 0.91% 0.33% 
1984 73.82% 9.23% 11.04% 4.65% 0.94% 0.34% 
1985 73.87% 9.31% 11.09% 4.59% 0.90% 0.23% 
1986 73.45% 9.35% 11.21% 4.70% 0.97% 0.33% 
1987 73.44% 9.40% 11.26% 4.75% 0.92% 0.22% 
1988 73.16% 9.45% 11.37% 4.80% 0.96% 0.26% 
1989 73.04% 9.50% 11.43% 4.85% 0.95% 0.23% 
1991 73.22% 9.50% 11.33% 4.76% 0.95% 0.24% 
1992 73.45% 9.48% 11.23% 4.67% 0.93% 0.24% 
1993 73.19% 9.59% 11.35% 4.66% 0.94% 0.27% 
1994 73.17% 9.63% 11.33% 4.65% 0.96% 0.27% 
1995 73.35% 9.58% 11.27% 4.62% 0.94% 0.24% 
1996 73.55% 9.53% 11.18% 4.54% 0.93% 0.27% 
1997 73.54% 9.51% 11.15% 4.57% 0.96% 0.27% 
1998 73.40% 9.49% 11.17% 4.63% 1.01% 0.31% 
1999 72.57% 9.65% 11.44% 4.88% 1.13% 0.33% 
2000 72.39% 9.66% 11.49% 4.92% 1.14% 0.39% 
2001 72.13% 9.68% 11.56% 5.01% 1.23% 0.40% 
2002 72.52% 9.58% 11.36% 4.90% 1.21% 0.42% 
2003 72.65% 9.56% 11.30% 4.89% 1.16% 0.44% 
2004 72.60% 9.53% 11.28% 4.91% 1.20% 0.48% 
2005 72.49% 9.52% 11.30% 4.98% 1.26% 0.45% 
2006 72.37% 9.46% 11.24% 5.01% 1.28% 0.64% 
2007 72.26% 9.44% 11.24% 5.05% 1.36% 0.65% 
 
Table A4. Share of the total gross wage of different fractiles (Exhaustive files) 
Year F0-90 F90-95 F95-99 F99-99.9 F99.9-99.99 F99.99-100 
(Old series) 1994 74.03% 9.45% 10.99% 4.42% 0.88% 0.23% 
1995 74.21% 9.41% 10.94% 4.36% 0.86% 0.22% 
1996 74.33% 9.38% 10.87% 4.33% 0.87% 0.23% 
1997 74.28% 9.37% 10.85% 4.36% 0.90% 0.25% 
1998 74.28% 9.37% 10.85% 4.36% 0.90% 0.25% 
1999 73.77% 9.41% 10.96% 4.51% 1.02% 0.33% 
2000 73.43% 9.44% 11.05% 4.62% 1.09% 0.38% 
2001 73.19% 9.44% 11.11% 4.73% 1.16% 0.37% 
(New series) 2001 72.49% 9.63% 11.40% 4.90% 1.19% 0.39% 
2002 72.68% 9.60% 11.30% 4.84% 1.16% 0.43% 
2003 72.50% 9.77% 11.34% 4.82% 1.14% 0.43% 
2004 72.73% 9.55% 11.23% 4.86% 1.17% 0.46% 
2005 72.55% 9.55% 11.28% 4.93% 1.22% 0.48% 
2006 72.48% 9.53% 11.26% 4.96% 1.25% 0.52% 
2007 72.30% 9.50% 11.24% 5.02% 1.34% 0.60% 
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Table A5. Sector composition of the top 0.01% (Exhaustive files)  
  Finance     
Service to 
business    Entertainment     Other    
Year 
Share of total 
wages 
Share of top 
0.01% 
headcount 
Odds 
ratio 
Share of total 
wages 
Share of top 
0.01% 
headcount 
Odds 
ratio 
Share of total 
wages 
Share of top 
0.01% 
headcount 
Odds 
ratio 
Share of total 
wages 
Share of top 
0.01% 
headcount 
Odds 
ratio 
1994 0.06% 25% 8.98  0.05% 20% 2.99  0.02% 8% 7.55  0.11% 47% 0.41  
1995 0.04% 18% 6.08  0.06% 27% 3.57  0.02% 8% 6.95  0.11% 47% 0.40  
1996 0.04% 16% 4.89  0.07% 30% 4.24  0.03% 11% 9.76  0.10% 43% 0.37  
1997 0.06% 26% 9.27  0.07% 28% 3.71  0.02% 8% 6.82  0.10% 38% 0.33  
1998 0.06% 26% 9.27  0.07% 28% 3.71  0.02% 8% 6.82  0.10% 38% 0.33  
1999 0.13% 36% 15.75  0.07% 23% 2.57  0.04% 11% 8.51  0.10% 31% 0.26  
2000 0.13% 32% 13.54  0.09% 24% 2.63  0.04% 11% 8.41  0.12% 32% 0.27  
2001 0.15% 39% 18.68  0.08% 23% 2.37  0.04% 10% 7.35  0.10% 28% 0.24  
2001 0.16% 37% 18.23  0.08% 23% 1.87  0.04% 11% 6.30  0.11% 30% 0.24  
2002 0.16% 33% 16.14  0.10% 26% 2.19  0.05% 12% 7.05  0.12% 29% 0.24  
2003 0.13% 29% 13.92  0.09% 26% 2.30  0.05% 12% 8.09  0.15% 33% 0.27  
2004 0.19% 37% 19.52  0.10% 23% 1.97  0.04% 9% 6.29  0.13% 31% 0.25  
2005 0.14% 28% 13.27  0.11% 24% 2.02  0.06% 12% 8.68  0.17% 35% 0.29  
2006 0.17% 31% 14.65  0.12% 27% 2.22  0.05% 12% 7.79  0.18% 31% 0.25  
2007 0.25% 37% 19.42  0.12% 23% 1.73  0.06% 10% 6.67  0.17% 30% 0.25  
Note: In 2007, finance members of the top 0.01% earned globally 0.25% of total wages. They were 37% of this top fractile and were 19.4 more represented (in terms of odds ratio) in the 
top fractile than they are in the rest of the distribution. We correct the economic activity for holdings (cf. Appendices, sector coding). Sources: France – exhaustive job files DADS (1994-
2007).  
 
 
 
 
Graph A1. Decomposition of the variance of wages in the financial 
sectors 
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Var intra/Mean²
Var inter/Mean²
 
Note: In 2007, in the financial sector, the variance of wages was 5.4 times the square mean. 
This dispersion of wages ratio can be decomposed in the following way: the dispersion within 
units is 4.95, the dispersion between units is 0.48. Sources: France – exhaustive job files DADS 
(1994-2007), Finance sector only. 
 
   Graph A2. Top 1000 finance managers, non-finance managers, enter-
tainment and CEOs 
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Note: In 2007, we estimate, based on the panel that the top 1000 CEOs were paid 1,259,281 
euros on average. Sources: Panel DADS (1976-2007). 
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Sector coding 
Sectors NAP NAF 1993  
Finance 89, 7801 65, 67.1 
Insurance 88, 7802 66, 67.2 
Entertainment 86 92 
Service to business 76, 77 74 
Industry (and agriculture) 01-54, 56 01-41 
Construction 55 45 
Retail and restaurants 57-67 50-57 
Transport and communications 68-75 60-64 
Other services 90-97, 99 70-73, 90-99 
State, education, health 98 75-85 
Correction of sectors for holdings 
With the financialization of the firm, heads of firms are often constituted as 
holdings, managing many different units involved in many different economic 
activities. Their economic sector is difficult to code unilaterally. Therefore, 
before 1993, in the NAP nomenclature, INSEE gave them their own division 
(76). After 1993, in the NAF nomenclature, we find them inside the service to 
business division (74), the “administration of firm” code, “741J”, with other 
activities of firm management or representation. Holdings, therefore, are not 
totally isolated: in the Panel, we count 1756 individuals working for holdings in 
1992 whereas 7995 are working in the 741J “administration of firm” code in 
1993. 
Heads of groups, where we generally find the highest salaries, working in 
industry, retail, construction, transport, and finance, will therefore be coded in 
service to business. This type of coding might overestimate the role of service 
to business in higher fractiles. In order to eliminate this bias we tried to correct 
the coding. We used the 2002-2007 Lifi survey in order to correct the sector 
for heads of groups. When a head of group is coded as a holding we assign to 
it the sector of its biggest (in head-count) subsidy. 
For the years before 2002, we use the 2002 Lifi survey. The approximation 
is not too bad, as far as during the period holdings are generally created rather 
than destroyed. We reassign 20% of workers coded in 741J in 2007, 16% in 
2002, 13% in 1995, and 30% of workers coded in NAP76 in 1991, 20% in 
1976. 
Within the 2007 top 0.1% fractile, this correction helps to reduce the pro-
portion of wage-earners in service to business from 31% to 26%, and to 
increase that of industry from 11% to 14%, and that of retail and restaurants 
from 9 to 10%. It does not have much impact on other sectors, especially on 
finance. 
